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THE SPENCER ROANES OF 1958.t
JOHN

D.

O'REILLY, JR.*

THE SUPREME

COURT of the United States is a unique institution among appellate courts.' But it has one thing in common with
other judicial tribunals in that it has been, as have all courts since time
immemorial, the subject of complaints poured into sympathetic ears
by disappointed litigants and their counsel.2
From the time of John Jay the Court has been heaped with criticism, not infrequently amounting to invective and abuse. It has been
condemned by Jeffersonians and Jacksonians. It has been reviled by
Abolitionists. It has been cursed by those who saw it as the pawn of
corporate interests, as a conspirator against organized labor, as the
instrument of opponents of social reform, as the agent of the apostles
of socialism, as the destroyer of capitalism, as the pamperer of criminals, and as various other manifestations of the devil incarnate.
Pamphleteers, editorial writers and political demagogues have
always regarded the Court as fair game, with no closed seasons. But
the critics have not been limited to such as these. Judge Spencer Roane,
of Virginia, conducted vigorous campaigns in print against the Court
t The title should not give rise to invidious inferences based upon the legend
that, but for the resignation of Oliver Ellsworth, Roane, not Marshall, would have
been the fourth Chief Justice. That has been scotched as an "unsubstantiated tradition." Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, GOVERNMENT UNDER
LAW 11, (Sutherland ed. 1956); 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 221-22 (1955). The reference is to Roane's parts in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14' U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816), as described in I WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 447
(rev. ed. 1932) (in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 516 (1819) ;
and in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, at 554 (1821)). See also 4
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE oF JOHN MARSHALL, 157 (1929)
(on Martin case at 313; the
McCulloch case at 323; the Cohens case at 358). In general, on Roane, see Note,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1242 (1953).
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1928, Georgetown University; LL.B. 1932, Boston College; LL.M. 1933, Harvard University; Carnegie
Scholar, Ann Arbor, summer 1934.
1. See the address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar Association,
Work of the Federal Courts, 69 Sup. Ct. v, vi (1949).
2. See the Comments of the Court per Frankfurter J. in United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941), concerning the letters of Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace to the editor of the New York Times, published May 8, 1938, and that of
Frederick H. Wood, Esquire (counsel for the Livestock Commission Men) published
May 15, 1938, discussing the decision in Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).

(92)
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and its doctrine (although he had the good taste to use a pseudonym). 3
Even the scholarly Story, after the death of Marshall, expressed, in
private correspondence, doubts about the doctrines of the then new
majority of the Court.4 In more recent years, on the Court itself, the
summaries of dissents delivered on Opinion Days have been known
to contain sharp barbs which, however, did not find their way into
the United States Reports.'
Despite these familiar historical phenomena, it came as a distinct
shock in August, 1958, that the Conference of State Supreme Court
Chief Justices, at their annual meeting in Pasadena, California, exploded a formal resolution of denunciation of the Supreme Court. The
Conference's Committee on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by
Judicial Decisions released a report,' the conclusions of which formed
the basis of the resolution.
The prestige which should attach to the Conference suggests that
the criticisms and the basis thereof deserve more careful attention and
comment than would the diatribes of the familiar casual columnist
or the axe-grinding politician.
No attempt will be made to paraphrase the terms in which the
Chief Justices found fault with the Court. Their Resolution is set
forth, in full, in the Appendix hereto. Nor should the ensuing remarks
be taken as an apologia for the Court. That would be presumptuous.
What is intended is the suggestion that (assuming, arguendo, the
propriety of public discussion of such a subject by the Pasadena discussants) when comment upon public institutions or doctrines is made
by groups of high professional standing it should bear the earmarks
of high professional competency, it should be precisely stated, and it
should be supported by its internal cogency rather than by the putative
authority of its expositors.
3. I

WARREN,

TH4 SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY 516, 555 (rev. ed.

1932).
4. Id., II, 28.
5. The extreme instance of this sort of thing was perhaps the utterance of Mr.
Justice Reynolds, who prefaced the oral announcement of his dissent in Norman v.
B&O R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)
with: ". . . [Tihe Constituiton, as we have known it, is dead."
6. The Report has been distributed in mimeograph form by the Conference. It

has been published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal in the issues of August 21 and
22, 1958. A preliminary release, printed in 104 CONG. REc. Appendix A 7782
(daily ed. August 25, 1958) includes a few passages which were deleted prior to
ultimate submission of the Report. All quotations from the Report herein are from
the final version submitted to the Conference.
[However, for the convenience of the reader, major quotations from the Report
will be cited to the Congressional Record. Ed.]
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I.
THE REPORT.

After quoting Madison's prediction in The Federalist No. 45
that the great bulk of regulatory jurisdiction would remain in the
states, the Report recites that the "outstanding development in FederalState relations since the adoption of the national Constitution has been
the expansion of the power of the National Government and the relative
contraction of the powers of the state governments." 7 This, the Committee immediately concedes, has been a matter of practical necessity.
The Report then proceeds: "Second only to the increasing dominance of the National Government has been the development of the
immense power of the Supreme Court in both state and national affairs.
It is not merely the final arbiter of the law; it is the maker of policy
in many major social and economic fields." ' Policy making is not
defined in the Report, but, whatever it is, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish it precisely from exercise of "the judicial function." Indeed
a court may sometimes be required to "make what is actually a policy
decision by choosing between two rules, either of which might be deemed
applicable to the situation presented in a pending case." 9 (In its statement of conclusions the Committee asserts that, ". . . the Supreme
Court has frequently - one might, indeed, say customarily - exer-

cised policymaking powers going far beyond those involved, say, in
making a selection between competing rules of law.") 1"
Then, still without the laying of a foundation, there follows this
amazing paragraph:
"But if and when a court, in construing and applying a constitutional provision or a statute becomes a policymaker, it may
leave construction behind and exercise functions which are essentially legislative in character, whether they serve in practical effect
as a constitutional amendment or as an amendment of a statute.
It is here that we feel the greatest concern, and it is here that
we think the greatest restraint is called for. There is nothing
new in urging judicial self-restraint, though there may be, and
we think there is, new need to urge it." (Emphasis added.)"
After this undocumented thrust, the Report reverts to the topic
of expansion of national power. It refers, discursively, to the Supremacy
7. 104 CONG. Rnc. Appendix A 7783 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 7787.
11. Id. at 7783.
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Clause, the commerce power, the Income Tax Amendment, the General Welfare Clause and federal grants-in-aid. The discussion of the
factors in the growth of the central Government concludes with the
observation that, ".

.

12
. since the decision of Massachusetts v. Mellon,

there seems to be no effective way in which either a State or an individual can challenge the validity of a Federal grant-in-aid."" The
relevance of this statement to the Report is not immediately apparent.
It may be the Committee's way of fixing upon the Court responsibility
for the enlargement of federal functions. It is almost certainly not
intended as an encomium of the Court's "judicial restraint" in declining to inquire into the validity of appropriation acts.
Coming finally to an area where the Court's actions take on a
greater degree of significance, the Report speaks of the doctrine of
preemption of state authority by federal legislation. After noting the
recent application of the doctrine in the non-commerce field of regulation of sedition (without noting that it had long been applicable in
the non-commerce field of bankruptcy) 4 the Committee concludes that
the "fact ... rthat the decision in the Nelson" case affirmed the state
court decision] emphasizes rather than detracts from the wide sweep
now given to the doctrine of preemption."' 6
In the labor-relations field, the Report goes on, the doctrine has
brought about considerable confusion and uncertainty. The Wisconsin
Bus case' 7 points up or creates ("depending upon how one looks at the
matter") serious problems in that it leaves states without jurisdiction
to prevent strikes by employees of public utilities. Note is made,
however, of the Gonzales" and Russell 9 cases, which sustained state
court judgments for damages against unions for certain unlawful
conduct.
In perhaps dubious connection with preemption the Committee
reports that it finds certain language in the majority opinion in Textile
Union v. Lincoln Mills"0 "disturbing." That language was to the effect
that Section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, in providing for federal
court suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements, constitutes a mandate to federal courts to formulate a body of federal law
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

262 U.S. 447 (1923).
104 CoNG. RNc. Appendix A 7783 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
104 CONG. Rtc. Appendix A 7784 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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for the enforcement of such agreements. Why this is disturbing is
not immediately explained. (One might have thought it a direction to
do, within an area clearly subject to federal control, what English
and American common-law judges have been doing for centuries
and what federal judges, acting in forbidden areas, had been doing
prior to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.)21 But in the statement of its conclusions, the Committee says that this language,
*

. reads to us very much as if the Supreme Court found in a

somewhat obscurely worded section of the Labor Management
Relations Act a grant by Congress to the Federal courts of a power
closely approximating legislative power. Perhaps no more is meant
by the term to fashion a body of Federal law than to interpret
and apply a statute whose meaning is rather vague, but the pos22
sible implications of this phrase may be considerably broader.
The Committee refers with approbation to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, remarking, perhaps over-optimistically: "This marked the end
of the doctrine of a Federal common law in such [diversity] cases." 2
The course of decisions under which state courts were allowed increasingly wider scope of jurisdiction to render in personam judgments
against non-residents is noted with approval, save, perhaps, as the
trend was "halted" in Hanson v. Denckla."4 With some unspecified
reservations, "on the whole the Supreme Court seems perhaps to have
taken a more liberal view in recent years toward the validity of State
25
taxation than it formerly took."

The Report then returns to the attack and brings up the matter
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Committee's complaint about
the Court's implementation of substantive due process consists of criticism of three classes of cases. Exception is taken to the result reached
in the Sweezy 2" case in which the Court found a due process limitation
upon the investigatory powers of a state legislature. Next are cases
involving termination of public employment of employees charged with
association with subversive groups. The cases,27 in some of which
the court overruled, and in others of which it sustained public authori21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See the application of the Lincoln Mills Doctrine in
Engineers Association v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1958). Also,
see Mishkin, The Variousness of Federal Law, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
22. 104 CONG.Rtc. Appendix A 7787 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
23. Id. at 7784.
24. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
25. 104 CONG. Rnc. Appendix A 7784 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
26. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
27. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) ; Beilan v. Board of Education, 357
U.S. 399 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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ties in their discharge of employees are simply listed but not commented
upon. Finally, the Report discusses at length the Konigsberg's case
in which the Court reversed the denial of the petitioner's application
for admission to the bar on the ground that his refusal to answer
questions as to his membership in and association with the Communist
Party and other organizations established lack of the requisite good
moral character. The Report forcefully criticizes the result reached by
the Court there and supports the position taken by Mr. Justice Harlan
as set forth in his dissenting opinion.
The Report fails to set forth any doctrine, judicial attitude, or
other element common to the three cited decisions or to indicate in
what way the criticism of the individual cases tends to support the
generality of the introductory sentence of the section of the Report
in which these cases are discussed: "In other fields, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked to cut down State action." 9
The final portion of the Report touches upon Supreme Court
review of procedure in state criminal cases. This part, too, consists
of lengthy summaries of four such cases," ° expression of disagreement
with the results reached in all four, and speculation as to the possible
practical implications of two, which involved, basically, a single issue,
an indigent defendant's right to a transcript of the trial record for appeal.
By way of conclusion the Committee, after protesting its awareness of the fact that changing conditions require constant adjustments
in federal-state relations, expresses the view that "the overall tendency
of decisions of the Supreme Court over the last 25 years or more has
'1
been to press the extension of federal power and to press it rapidly,"'
and sets forth the thoughts summarized in the resolution adopted by a
36 to 8 vote of the Conference, which appears in the Appendix hereof.
II.
STATES'

RIGHTS.

The Report states: "The difference between matters primarily
local and matters primarily national was the guiding principle upon
which the framers of our National Constitution acted in outlining the
' 2
division of powers between the National and the State Governments."
28. Koigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). The Report does not specifically
refer to Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
29. 104 CONG. REc. Appendix A 7784 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
30. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Lambert v.

California, 355 U.S. 255 (1957) ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) ; Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
31. 104 CONG. REc. Appendix A 7787 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
32. Id. at 7782-83.
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This is not an accurate statement. Indeed, the writings of de
Tocqueville 3 and Madison, 4 quoted in the Report, indicate that the
shadings connoted by the adverb "primarily" did not enter into the
calculations of the Fathers. For them, each subject of government
fell under either the nation or the states, and most subjects were to
be under the states. There were to be areas of black and of white, but
no grays. This was the orthodox assumption upon which Marshall
wrote in the Steamship Case."8 He wanted to establish that the federal
area was a little, perhaps substantially, larger than Madison had thought
it would be, but he did not dispute that the state area was a separate
one. He may have had some misgivings, five years later, about the
implications of the Blackbird Creek86 case as he was writing the cryptic
opinion he filed there, but he did not question the accepted postulate.
After all, this was but the second Commerce Clause case to come before
the Court.
8 7 case, that
It was not until 1851, in the Philadelphia Pilotage
Mr. Justice Curtis was able to announce that the separate-exclusive
compartments theory of distribution of powers between nation and
states was an unrealistic over-generalization, unworkable as a starting
point of constitutional exposition. Congress, of course, has power to
regulate commerce, but it does not follow that the states are completely powerless. There are regulations of commerce which only Congress can make but the entire commerce area is not closed to the states.
The disclosure of this dichotomy suggests the relevance of a passage from de Tocqueville, shortly following the one quoted in the
Report. After expressing agreement with the Madisonian prophecy
that state regulation would be the rule and federal regulation the exception, the author goes on:
"But as it was foreseen that, in practice, questions might
arise as to the exact limits of this exceptional authority, and it
would be dangerous to submit these questions to the decision of
the ordinary courts of justice established in the different states by
the states themselves, a high Federal court was created, one of
whose duties was to maintain the balance of power between the
two rival' 8 governments as it had been established by the Constitution.

33. I De TOCQUEVILL8,
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

THE FEDERALIST No.

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 118 (Vintage Book ed. 1954).

45 (Madison).

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
Cooley v. Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
I Dn TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 119 (Vintage Book ed. 1954).
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It was only after the Court discovered that the constitutional distribution of governmental powers was not altogether made in terms
of black and white that it became proper to think in terms of things
"primarily" local and things "primarily" national. But this kind of
thinking came to be done in a negative sort of way. Typically, it came
to be recognized that there is' a legitimate public interest in keeping
utility rates at a reasonable level, so that implementation of this interest
may require regulation of the rates by public authority, 9 but, if a
particular utility is an interstate carrier, the ("primary," if you will)
40
national interest cannot tolerate rate regulation by state authority.
It can be pointed out that the inroads started by Mr. Justice Curtis
into the separate compartments theory of distribution of powers were
directed to the issue of exclusiveness or non-exclusiveness of federal
powers, and did not logically call for fragmentation of the Madisonian
preserve of the states. Indeed, the United States Reports are replete
with impassioned declarations that such things as insurance, 41 manufacture4 2 and mining" are not commerce. These declarations go on
to recite that the activities in question are subject to state, not federal
control, and to indicate that, if this were not so, the life of federalism
would be at an end. Whether or not these recitals be thought extravagancies, they were, with one transitory exception," all expressed
in cases where the challenges that were made were to state regulation,
and where there was no question of actually attempted federal control.
But "the life of the law has not been logic",4 and, whether by
logical necessity from the original break in the Madisonian theory
or not, we were driven to recognize the converse of the Philadelphia
Pilotage4" doctrine, and to admit the power of Congress sometimes to
regulate that which the states have power to regulate.
When the deficiencies of state power to regulate interstate carriage
rates became known, the necessity of some sort of regulation produced
the Interstate Commerce Act.47 Eventually, it was learned that effective
control under that act would sometimes involve regulation of intra39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Wabash v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
See Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

45. HOLMEs,

TmE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

46. See text at note 37 supra.
47. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1952).
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state rates, a subject normally within state domain. The necessity of
federal control of the subject determined the existence of federal power
to reach the subject.48
The semantics of constitutional law should have told us, ever since
McCulloch v. Maryland,49 that, given an Interstate Commerce Act, if
it is necessary and proper for effective enforcement of that act to
have federal regulation of the completely internal commerce of a state,
such regulation may be imposed. We, of course, did not know any such
thing until the majority of a divided Court told us so, ninety-five
years after McCulloch v. Maryland.
The process of constitutional adjudication is not a matter of
semantics. It consists of the utilization of authoritatively received
techniques to ascertain, with the aid of argument by skilled counsel in
adversary proceedings, what ideals and standards, as well as formalized
rules, are relevant in particular cases, and to apply them to the resolution of controversies. Nearly every case before the Court involves
exploration of a new territory, with occasional incidental (and, infrequently, direct) re-exploration of an old one. The specific criteria
are few, and dimly illumined. These are facts known to all students
of the Court.
It is amazing, though, to find in the Report such language as
this, in tones of accusation:
"It has long been an American boast that we have a government of laws and not of men. We believe that any study of recent
decisions of the Supreme Court will raise at least considerable
doubt as to the validity of that boast. We find first that in constitutional cases unanimous decisions are comparative rarities
and that multiple opinions, concurring or dissenting, are common
occurrences. We find next that divisions in result on a 5-to-4
basis are quite frequent. We find further that on some occasions
a majority of the Court cannot be mustered in support of any
one opinion and that the result of a given case may come from
the divergent views of individual Justices who happen to unite
on one outcome or the other of the case before the Court."5
The "Government of Laws" formula had no more literal validity
when John Adams penned it in 1780"1 than did the tripartite separation48.
49.
50.
51.

The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
104 CONG. Rc. Appendix A 7788 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declaration of Rights, Art. XXX:
"In the government of this Commonwealth, judicial powers or either
of them; The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
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of-powers formula with which he prefaced it. The two formulae, conjunctively, are expressive of a broad, universally applicable ideal of
democratic government, whose detailed meaning, however, must needs
be (as it has been) gradually adumbrated over the years in the light
of the various situations upon which it has been brought to bear.
They certainly do not envisage the body of law, particularly the law
of the Constitution, as an all-inclusive code to be administered by the
judges in a ministerial way.
Too many people have been intrigued with the mechanical simplicity of the process of constitutional adjudication as it seems to them
to be described by Mr. Justice Roberts in the Butler Case.52
"When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with
the former."
Too few people read on to the two following sentences, where
the Justice utters the disarming understatement:
"All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered
judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if such it
may be called, is the power of judgment."
The fact is that the Constitution itself sets forth no such doctrine
as that which Madison and de Tocqueville describe, and save for two
aberrational decisions of the Supreme Court no such doctrine has ever
been recognized in actual practice. One of these was United States v.
Butler " where the Court struck down the first Agricultural Adjustment Act on the ground that if crop plantings are to be cut back by
law it must be by state, not national law. That sort of thinking, of
course, has not had any legal effect since the Court sustained the power
of Congress to enact the Social Security Law.54 Indeed, the Committee must have recognized this fact. Its Report cites the Social Sepowers, or either of them; The judicial shall never exercise the legislative
and executive, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of
laws and not of men."
That this doctrine was not literally followed in the Massachusetts Constitution itself
was pointed out by Madison in THx FEDERALIST No. 42. The Massachusetts Court
has been less than literal in applying the Article. See LaChapelle v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 318 Mass. 166, 61 N.E.2d 8 (1945).
52. United States'v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
53. Ibid.
54. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937).
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curity Cases, although with somewhat different emphasis. The other
case, of course, was Hammer v. Dagenhar 5 which likewise has long
been repudiated.
The Report refers to the Butler case as one in which the Court
'took a broad view of the General Welfare Clause but found it inapplicable in the case so that its implementation was postponed until later
decisions. The Report does not express it in so many words but the
reference to the case in the context of reference to the Madison doctrine
of distribution of powers reveals a nostalgia for the never-never land
into which Mr. Justice Roberts, for the Court, journeyed in order to
avoid application of the General Welfare Clause there.
It is not without irony that the asserted inattention of the Court
to state sovereignty elicited from the Chief Justices their exhortation
"that that great Court exercise to the full its power of judicial selfrestraint by adhering firmly to its tremendous strictly judicial powers
and by eschewing, so far as possible, the exercise of essentially legislative powers when it is called upon to decide questions involving
the validity of state action . . . ."" When the majority of the Court
in the Butler case ruled an act of Congress invalid because it invaded
an area reserved to the states, Mr. Justice (as he then was) Stone
felt impelled in dissent to admonish the brethren: ". . . [T]he only
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of selfrestraint.""7 Thus, what is essentially the same rhetorical flourish is
used in support of both sides of the argument.
There is serious question, however, how far rhetorical flourishes
may be used legitimately in the formulation of constitutional doctrine.
When the same Mr. Justice Stone spoke for the majority which gave
the coup de grace to the enclave-of-exclusive-state-jurisdiction doctrine
he wrote the aphorism that "the [Tenth] Amendment states but a
truism that all is retained that has not been surrendered."5 " Epigramatic
this is; sound law it is not. A play upon the words of the Tenth
Amendment should not guide us to the opposite extreme from the
position of the majority in Butler, nor obscure the fact that, whether
by "an invisible radiation from the Tenth Amendment," 59 or otherwise,
the actuality of state sovereignty in a federal union is a most important
factor in the evaluation of both state and federal laws. The Stone
epigram, if it is to be considered significant at all, should be taken
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
104 CONG. REc. Appendix A 7788 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
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simply as a warning that the Tenth Amendment does not set forth
a formula by which the process of evaluation is to be worked out.
A more persuasive refutation of the "States' rights" argument
advanced in the Wage and Hour case was Stone's succinct phrase,
"Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been followed". 6" This was documented by citation of cases in which the Court had decided subsequent
to 1918 (as it likewise had prior to that year) that Congress could
properly regulate many of the things which John Marshall, in an
earlier day, described as "the completely internal commerce of a state." 61
It should perhaps be emphasized at this point that Marshall's use
of this phrase was completely obiter, possibly an inadvertent acquiescence in the "enclave" states' rights theory, possibly a conscious sop
to those who would be shocked by his proclamation of federalist doctrine. It was on the basis of a verbal inference, not of experience and
reflection, that Marshall assumed the existence of concerns "which do
not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government." 62 It should be borne in mind that this assumption of Marshall
was only remotely incidental to his main purpose of the moment;
that was to describe affirmatively what the "commerce" of Article I,
Section 8 was, rather than what it was not.
The ideal of federalism which has come to be established is not
one of pitting the states against the United States in eternal conflict,
but rather one of efficient division of labor and cooperation to achieve
the sometimes forgotten objectives set forth in the Preamble:
.. . [E] stablish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The story of joint
60. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).

61. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
62.
"Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be re-

restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The

phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the
completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for
that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended, would not have been made,
had the intention been to extend the power to every description. The
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something,
if we regard the language, or the subject of the sentence, must be the
exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and character of
the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all
the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which
affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within
a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it
is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the
general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce
of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself." 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
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action by state and national governments for the solution of public
problems, such as control of narcotics traffic,6 3 theft of motor vehicles,64
commercial prostitution6 5 and an infinite variety of other matters is
too familiar to require cataloging here.
III.
FEDERAL POWERS.

There is another sense in which the phrase "States' rights" is
frequently used. This is in connection with situations where statefederal cooperation is not permitted because the Congress has enacted
legislation which has "occupied the field" and thus barred or superseded state action, even by way of supplementary legislation. This, of
course, is the converse of the discredited doctrine of states' rights referred to above.
Contrary to a possible implication of the Committee Report the
doctrine of preemption was not newly invented even as to labor relations in the Wisconsin Bus case.66 The doctrine was actually the
basis of Marshall's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden,67 although many
years elapsed after that decision before the preemption doctrine as
such was formally recognized.
The Committee Report seems to complain of the "wide sweep
now given to the doctrine of preemption. 0' 8 The precise point (or
points) of the complaint is not clear, unless it is a part of the criticism
that Supreme Court decisions have left too small and/or too indefinite
areas for exercise of state regulatory powers.
The Report would convey to the casual reader an impression
that the practice of the Court is to use every opportunity to trample
roughshod on state laws whenever it is possible to find a federal law
which can be construed as superseding one of them. This impression,
perhaps not intended, would be a completely distorted one. The fact
of the matter is that the Court is always deeply conscious of the importance of state sovereignty and usually attempts to find a basis upon
which continued exercise of state power can be reconciled with the
demands of federal law administration.
Thus, although it was established even in John Marshall's day
that exercise of the bankruptcy power will normally be to place state
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
See note 17 supra.
See note 35 supra.
104 CONG. Rlc. Appendix A 7784 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
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laws in abeyance, 9 the Court's insistence upon the necessity of preserving a balance in federal-state relations led it to scrutinize the federal bankruptcy power so closely that the Municipal Bankruptcy Act
was held ultra vires by the Congress.7" (As it turned out this was a too
deferential gesture to local sovereignty. At the request of the states,
Congress enacted a modified statute giving the benefits of bankruptcy
administration to political subdivisions of the States) .7 1 Of course
deference to state sovereignty must have its limits, and when exercise
of state authority is clearly incompatible with, for example, efficient
administration of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy
72
Act, state authority must give way.
Bankruptcy is of course not the only area in which the Court has
exercised restraint in application of the preemption principle. Even
in the field of anti-trust regulation where the reach of Congress has
been held to touch many local affairs related to commerce only by the
most tenuous of ties, the Court has performed its function of interpreting anti-trust legislation with a careful eye on the possible impacts
73
of alternative interpretations upon the sovereign powers of the States.
In areas, such as highway regulations and the like, where states have
particular legislative competence, the Court has been particularly reluctant to discern in federal legislation a policy which would require
that state laws be superseded.74 On one occasion, indeed, a majority
of the Court went to the extreme of sustaining a state law which was
an exact duplicate of a federal law covering the same subject simply
because it was not repugnant to the latter.75
What is too often overlooked by critics of preemption is that
there is no single formula of preemption. Each case must be decided
upon its own facts. Perhaps some cases have been wrongly decided.
That is beside the present point. It is quite understandable that when
the Supreme Court sees in federal legislation a pattern indicative
of a congressional purpose to take over exclusive regulation of a
69. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) ; Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
70. Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
71. 50 STAT. 653 (1937), 11 U.S.C. § 401 (1952). See United States v. Bekins,
304 U.S. 27 (1938).
72. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939).
73. United States v. Women's Sportswear Assn., 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Federal
Trade Comm. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) ; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940).
74. This has been true whether attack upon state laws in this field is based upon
asserted negative implications of the Commerce Clause (South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) ; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307
(1925)) ; or upon asserted preemption by federal law (Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79 (1939)).
75. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
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subject such as seditious activity, other able and sincere men, looking
at the same legislation may not be able to perceive the same pattern
which the Court saw. If the other group of men should constitute a
majority of the Congress and should conclude, for example, that the
pattern of federal legislation in the area of control of subversive activity
is not ideologically and practically incongruous with state control in
the area, the Congress may, by a simple (or perhaps a complex) act
of legislation, restore state jurisdiction in that area or any part thereof.
What is important is that there is no area of state regulation which is
immune to preemption. That the course of decision bearing upon a
given area may often leave serious problems and even grave uncertainty
as to just how much has been preempted serves only to emphasize
the involved intricacy of federal-state relations in complexly developed
fields.
The difficulty of finding solutions to these problems will not be
removed by hurling epithets at the Court which has to make the best
possible adjustments of the conflicting forces which bear upon cases
coming before it. The fact should be faced up to that the problems
are not simple and cannot be simplified by conjuring up a magical
recipe for rendering to the nation the things that are the nation's, and
to the states the things that are the states'.
The field of labor-relations control appears to the Committee to
yield particularly bitter fruit. Yet it is the field which perhaps best
illustrates the point just stated. Congress, in 1947, made express provision for preserving by delegation some area of state jurisdiction in
that field.16 Yet, in the intervening years, it has been administratively
impossible to implement that act of preservation.
That attempt at
reservation to the states was by way of carving out an exception to
a more general doctrine of preemption reached by the Court under
the Wagner Act of 1935. Again, in all the intervening years, Congress
has been unable to produce a formula which would at once keep the
policy of the National Labor Relations Act intact and preserve specific
items for state control. Administrative failure or inability, whether
for budgetary, policy or other reasons, to take jurisdiction of certain
matters covered by the legislation do not, as a matter of logical necessity, indicate a void which must be filled by state control until the
failure or inability is ended. They may simply indicate a void.
In the light of these considerations "what is to be thought of the
following observation in the Report?
76. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952).
77. Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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"Regardless of what may be the ultimate solution of jurisdictional problems in this [labor relations] field, it appears that
at the present time there is unfortunately a kind of no-man's land
in which serious uncertainty exists. This uncertainty is in part
undoubtedly due to the failure of Congress to make its wishes
entirely clear. Also, somewhat varying views appear to have
been adopted by the Supreme Court from time to time."78
Despite the fact that the Report has placed division of sovereignty
on the same level with intragovernmental separation of powers, the
Committee belabors the Court for its decision in Textile Union v. Lincoln Mills." It felt that the Court had, somehow, offered an affront
to the sovereign states by construing Section 301 (a) of the Taft Hartley
Act as containing a mandate to federal courts to formulate a body of
federal law to govern breaches of collective bargaining agreements.
Before belatedly recognizing that Section 301 (a) may have the effect
of ousting state courts of jurisdiction to give relief for breach of collective bargaining agreements subject to the federal act, the Report
complains bitterly of the hardship the decision imposes upon state
courts which may have to ascertain what the applicable federal law
may be.
In its haste to condemn the Court for this imaginary grievance,
the Committee overlooks completely the alternative which had been
urged upon the Court. That was to declare Section 301 (a) unconstitutional as in excess of the powers contained in Article III. That
the Court exercised great restraint, if not ingenuity, in refraining
from overruling Congress, even after a third of its membership (constituting half of those then voting on the question) 0 had once expressed
the thought that this would be in order, does not mitigate the guilt
of adopting "the role of policy-maker without proper judicial restraint."
IV.
THE ROLE OF THE COURT.

There is a third sense in which the phrase "States' rights" may
be used and it is this sense which has been the basis of the more enlightened controversies over constitutional adjudications, particularly
in recent years.
There are certain provisions of the constitution which expressly
say that the states must not do various things. They must not coin
78. 104 CONG. Rc.Appendix A 7784 (daily ed. Aug.25, 1958).

79. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
80. See Westinghouse Employees v.Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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money or grant any title of nobility or make laws impairing the obligation of contract and so on. There are also some prohibitions which
are not so specific. The Fourteenth Amendment recites that no state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. Such a constitutional limitation, administered by courts in
their review of the acts of other branches of government, leaves the
courts with a standard for decision virtually as broad as those which
Justices Samuel Chase and Johnson once thought should be applied."'
This result would at least seem to run counter to the thesis of Justice
Iredell, s2 in his reply to Chase, that the Court does not have a roving
commission to administer justice, but is limited to expounding the
Constitution.
This, in substance, is what Judge Learned Hand 3 had in mind
when he recently at least came close to suggesting (one suspects somewhat tongue-in-cheek) that, apart from procedural matters, a simple
solution of many of the problems of judicial review would be to make
the implementation of the Due Process Clause none of the Supreme
Court's business. Hand, however, was careful to postulate in his argument that it is beyond the competency of any court to determine as
a basis of judicial decision the content of the political ideals summarized
in the phrase "due process of law." 4 That postulate has in recent
years been the subject of controversy in the Court itself, Justice Frankfurter being the principle spokesman of those who believe that the
Court has such competency, and Justice Black advocating the opposing viewpoint.8 "
Although the Committee cites Judge Hand's lectures in support
of its condemnation of the exercise by the Court of "primarily legislative powers," there is no indication in the Report that the Committee
would divest the Court of jurisdiction to expound the Due Process
Clause in its substantive phases. The complaint of the Committee is
not only sparsely documented but it is completely lacking in precision
of statement. The clear impression is created that the Committee has
no more than a visceral feeling that somehow the Court has gone "too
far" in limiting freedom of choice on the part of state legislatures
and courts in the name of the Due Process Clause.
81. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 143 (1810) ; Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
82. Calder v. Bull, supra note 81, at 398-99.
83. HAND, THn BILL op RICHrS (1958).
84. Id. at 3, 34.
85. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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The very notion of judicial review imports something of the superlegislature, or Learned Hand's "third chamber." 6 It should not, of
course, develop into too much of that, but the line between "just
enough" and "too much" cannot be drawn with precision in due process
cases any more than in commerce cases."s This line, as are so many
others, is a variable, located differently in different times and different
circumstances. Its location in any given context is necessarily determined by the Court itself upon consideration of a great complex of
relevant factors. To criticize the Court's location of the line in any
given instance on the ground that the Court's action is making ours
a government of men rather than of laws is to succumb to a tyranny
of platitudes.
"States' rights," in the third sense, may be taken to signify the
deference to which state dignity and sovereignty are entitled, so that
these should be taken into account whenever the Constitution itself,
as well as acts of Congress, is sought to be applied in such a way as to
forbid the exercise of an asserted state power. This deference, although
it is a very real and vital factor in the process of constitutional decision,
is an imponderable element. Its intensity cannot be measured, in a
given instance, or even over a period of time, by simply stating the
results reached in specific cases. The presence or absence of this ingredient is to be determined by close and critical analysis of the Court's
technique of decision and observation of its treatment of the various
components of the complex of relevant factors before it. It is not a
valid criticism to say simply, "I disagree with the decision the Court
made, and I think the Court is going too far."
In dealing with Supreme Court review of criminal procedure in
state courts, the assertion is made in the Report that in many matters,
such as the fair drawing of juries and the like, "we do not believe that
there is any real difference in doctrine between the views held by the
Supreme Court of the United States and the views held by the higher
courts of the several states.""8
It hardly needs pointing out that in all of the cases in which convictions had to be reversed because of failure of state criminal courts
to observe the minimal rudiments of fair procedure, none came to the
Court upon appeal by the state from a decision of the highest court
of a state disapproving the procedure followed at the trial. In every
86. HAND, op. cit. supra note 83, at 42.
87. Compare Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911)
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizonia, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
88. 104 CONG. Rwc. Appendix A 7786 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
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case a state appellate court had already countenanced denial, at the
trial level, of a defendant's right to due process of law.
Indeed, the greater threat to the vindication of individual rights
in this area would seem to consist, not in the Supreme Court exercising undue zeal in reviewing asserted state court denials of such rights,
but rather in such widespread complacency on the part of state courts
in the face of invasions of such rights that the Supreme Court may
well be embarrassed into withholding its reversing hand, lest it seem
to probe too far into what some would call the minutest of local law
enforcement machinery. This may. well have been the basis of last
term's reluctant refusal to affix the tag of unconstitutionality to police
denial of access by lawyers to their clients between the times of arrest
and arraignment."9 The judicial restraint which the Conference charges
to be lacking in the Court was manifestly present in these cases.
But (passing its questionable assertion of general adherence by
the highest state courts to basic doctrines of fair criminal procedure)
the Conference Committee complains that "In such matters the Supreme
Court not only feels free to review the facts, but considers it to be its
duty to make an independent review of the facts." 9 Reference is
made to the traditional attitude of appellate courts to findings of fact
in private law cases. "Appellate courts generally will give great weight
to the findings of fact by courts which had the opportunity to see and
hear the witnesses, and they are reluctant to disturb such findings."'"
It is at this point that the Conference Committee reveals a lack
of understanding of the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional
adjudication. This approach indicates failure to appreciate the lesson
taught by John Marshall that "we must never forget it is a Constitution
we are expounding." 92 Overlooked is the great difference between
findings of the trial judge in an ordinary case of specific performance
and findings of facts upon the existence or non-existence of which
fundamental rights guaranteed by the organic law depend. Overlooked
is the explanation of Chief Justice Taft of the practical necessity of
independent fact determination by the Supreme Court if it is to fulfill
the constitutional function it has exercised ever since Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee.9" The late Chief Justice once said:
89. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958) ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
90. 104 CONG. Rxc. Appendix A 7786 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
91. Ibid.
92. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
93. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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"In cases brought to the Court from State Courts for review,
on the ground that a federal right set up in the State Court has
been wrongfully denied, and in which the State Court has put its
decision on a finding that the asserted federal right has no basis
in point of fact or has been waived or lost, this Court as an incident of its power to determine whether a federal right has been
wrongfully denied, may go behind the finding to see whether it
is without substantial support. If the rule were otherwise, it
almost always would be within the power of a State Court practically to prevent a review here." 4
The Conference Committee seeks to drive home its point by
taking issue, on the merits, with the decisions in two cases handed
down in the 1957 Term of the Court.9 Without pausing to join in
the debate, suffice it to say that such criticism has no bearing upon
the validity of the principle of independent review in the Supreme
Court of crucial factual determination, decisive of asserted federal rights.
In the Committee's references to the Court's implementation of
the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause the impression is given
that the Court is using this clause as a weapon for stripping the states
of powers which are properly theirs. Among its conclusion§ the Committee recites that the Report, "shows, on the whole, a continuing and,
we think, an accelerating trend toward increasing powers of the National
Government and correspondingly contracting those of the State governments . . . .Much [of this] comes from the extent of the control
over the action of the States which the Supreme Court exercises under
its views of the 14th amendment." 96
This proposition is not supported by any thesis developed in the
body of the Report. If, as could readily be established, there is a germ
of truth in the statement, the Report falls far short of presenting a
balanced and complete picture of the effect upon state autonomy of the
Court's course of exposition of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court, particularly in recent years, has gone far toward bringing to realization the Holmes-Brandeis ideal of the states operating
freely as social laboratories. As Mr. Justice Douglas said, in a case
where a State law was sustained, "but if our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic and
social affairs under legislative decision. 9' 7 In sustaining another state
94. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 324 (1921).
95. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957).
96. 104 CONG. Rpc. Appendix A 7787 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
97. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952). See New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion of Brandeis,
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law he proclaimed for the Court: "[T]he day is gone when this Court
uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down State laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, imprudent, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."98
The same Justice, in an extra-judicial pronouncement, after referring to the cases in which the foregoing statements appear, has
said :"
"This does not mean that legislators have carte blanche
that the States can enact any laws they choose, that there are
no limites to regulation. While the Court these days does not
strike down laws because it deems them unwise, improvident, or
inexpedient, it stands ready to act once the outside limits have
been breached. What those remedies are is impossible to define
except in terms of the concrete. And the illustrations to date are
rare because of the liberality of the present Court in applying the
test of constitutionality to social legislation."
No other explanation than a willingness to allow a maximum of
local discretion for the working out of local problems will rationalize
the Court's acceptance of such patently discriminatory classifications
as those involved in the cases of Michigan barmaids,' ° the Louisiana
river pilots,'' and the New York truck panel advertisers. 0 2 But when
discrimination becomes blatantly preferential, the mandate of the Equal
Protection Clause must be heeded.' 3 In the field of freedom of expression, the Court does not question the state's right to decide that
smut is not speech,"° but when the state sends its book burners to
touch their torches to sophisticated literature which is thought only
to be too strong for juvenile digestions, the Court rules that some other
cure of the problem must be sought.0 3 Even in the field of ChurchState relations, where passions run high and resentments are deep,
there are signs of a disposition in the Court to leave decision in the
hands of state government. After the broad dicta in Everson v. Board
of Education,'0° implemented by actual decision in McCollum v. Board
J.).

And see,

"...

[S]ocial experiments . . . in the insulated chambers afforded by

the several States." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (dissenting opinion
of Holmes, J.).
98. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
99. DOUGLAS, Wi TH8 JUDGEs 281 (1956).
100. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
101. Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
102. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
103. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
104. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
105. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
106. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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of Education, °7 the Court, in Zorach v. Clauson, °8 has apparently
decided at least to leave to the states a substantial area for official association with religious organizations, within which they will not be
visited with the sanctions of the "an establishment of religion" clause
of the Constitution. While inferences should not be drawn too freely
from the Court's refusal to take a case, the record shows that on three
recent occasions, the Court has declined to review state court decisions,
one of which sustained, and two of which rejected, claims of violation
of the "establishment" clause.' 09
V.
CONCLUSION.

Some of the more controversial of recent decisions of the Court
have happened to involve persons accused or suspected of subversive
activities or leanings,"' and the cases in which their claims of right
were sustained have occasioned severe denunciation of the Court on
the charge of partiality to subversion. Most of these cases grew out
of application of federal law by federal agencies. In some instances,
however, cases coming from the states have also arisen out of backgrounds of charged subversion,"' and these, too, have been added
to the specifications of superficial thinkers in the bill of particulars
against the Court, although such cases clearly posed legal issues entirely different from those which came up under federal law.
It would, of course, be unthinkable that the Chief Justices have
become infected with the virus of such undiscriminating criticism. Yet,
the Committee's Report and the Conference's Resolution show nothing
which indicates that their criticism of the Court rests on a more substantial base.
The Court should never be above or beyond the reach of the voices
of those who are competent to decry what it has done. But those who
decry should recognize and assume the responsibility of specifying
that which they censure, and should not issue condemnations in such
general terms as to attack the institution as a whole.
107. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
108. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
109. Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955)
Tudor v. Board, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816
(1954); People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950), appeal dismissed
"for want of a substantial federal question," 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
110. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957) ; Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
111. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) ; Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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Recent Congressional episodes illustrate the point. One reaction
to express disagreement with a number of decisions of the Court was
a blanket bill to curtail the Court's appellate jurisdiction." 2 This was
reminiscent of the Reconstruction Act".. which will forever stand as
an ignominious memorial of those who were intolerant of constitutionalism as defined by the traditional processes of judicial review.
Another reaction was to express a similar disagreement by a
series of bills to modify specific legal rules determined by decisions of
4
the Court."
While each of the latter bills is debatable on its merits, they are
all based upon the sound premise that it is possible, through constitutional means, to review even decisions of the Court which are felt to
be unwise or improvident, and that it is better to deal with perceived
shortcomings of the Court on a case-to-case basis than to undertake
wholesale revision of the Court's function in the constitutional system.
The state chief justices have been concerned, for some years past,
with a felt intrusion upon their autonomy through use of the federal
writ of habeas corpus to review state court judgments in criminal
cases."' They would do well to concentrate all of their energies upon
the pursuit of remedial legislation in this field," 6 rather than to dissipate
them in broad generalizations, difficult to substantiate, which may have
no more net effect than to reduce popular respect, not only of the
Supreme Court of the United States, but of the judiciary as an established institution.
112. S. 264, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). This ultimately was watered down
somewhat to deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction in specific classes of cases.
The bill failed of passage.
113. 15 STAT. 44 (1868). See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
Of a similar stamp were H.R. 3 and S. 337, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), which sought
to limit the doctrine of preemption by establishing a legislative drafting formula.
These bills failed of passage.
114. Typical was H.R. 11, 477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), which provided for
admissibility into evidence of confessions obtained between the time of arrest and the
time of arraignment, thus modifying the rules laid down in McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1942) and in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). This and
other comparable bills failed of passage in the 85th Congress.
115. 25 STATE GOVERNMENT 249 (1952), quoted in the opinion of the Court in
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 451 n. (1953), also quoted in the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Jackson therein at 539 n. See also the report of continued interest of
the Conference of the State Chief Justices in the subject, 27 STATE GOVERNMENT 209
(1954) ; 28 id.264 (1955).

116. H.R. 8361, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958), represented the perennial effort to
eliminate what are widely regarded as excesses in the scope of federal habeas corpus
in review of state criminal cases. This bill passed the House but was overlooked by

the Senate in the confusion attendant upon final adjournment.
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THE SPENCER ROANES OF

APPENDIX
RESOLUTION ADOPTED

1958

1 17

BY THE CONFERENCE OF STATE

COURT JUSTICES AT PASADENA,

AUGUST

SUPREME

CALIFORNIA

23, 1958.

RESOLVED:

1. That this conference approves the Report of the Committee
on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions submitted at this meeting.
2. That in the field of Federal-State relationships the division
of powers between those granted to the national government and those
reserved to the state governments should be tested solely by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the Amendments
thereto.
3. That this conference believes that our system of federalism,
under which control of matters primarily of national concern is committed to our national government and control of matters primarily
of local concern is reserved to the several states is sound and should
be more diligently preserved.
4. That this conference, while recognizing that the application of
constitutional rule to changed conditions must be sufficiently flexible
as to make such rules adaptable to altered conditions, believes that a
fundamental purpose of having a written constitution is to promote
the certainty and stability of the provisions of law set forth in such a
constitution.
5. That this conference hereby respectfully urges that the Supreme
Court of the United States, in exercising the great powers confided
to it for the determination of questions as to the allocation and extent
.of national and state powers, respectively, and as to the validity under
the Federal Constitution of the exercise of powers reserved to the
states, exercise one of the greatest of all judicial powers - the power
of judicial self-restraint - by recognizing and giving effect to the
difference between that which, on the one hand, the Constitution may
prescribe or permit, and that which, on the other, a majority of the
Supreme Court, as from time to time constituted, may deem desirable
117. New York Times, August 24, 1958, pp. 1, 42.
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or undersirable, to the end that our system of federalism may continue
to function with and through the preservation of local self-government.
6. That this conference firmly believes that the subject with
which the Committee on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by
Judicial Decisions has been concerned is one of continuing importance,
and that there should be a committee appointed to deal with the subject in the ensuing year.
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